Friday, December 5, 2008
Procedure FAT SDS and FGS
Procedure penting untuk test sds and fgs kat panel.
Tengoklah catatan daripada engineer di bawah :
Wednesday, December 3, 2008
Optimal Ethane Sphere Tank Project
Aku kena handle simple project untuk tambah IO.
Project ialah : Optimal Ethane Sphere Tank Project
Customer : Foxboro
Vendor : Invensys
Hanya guna 1 AI kad dan 1 DO kad.
Simple project, tapi penuh bermakna.
Push Button Cover or Flick Cover.
Client request untuk Push Button Cover@ Flick Cover.
Inilah ayatnya :
We requested to install flick cover on these two unit of switches to prevent accidental trigger on PSD & ESD since it is installed with other different type of functional switches. Please provide a proposal to install the flick cover on these switches.
Jenus jugak nak cari benda alah ni. (spec) dia. Akhirnya aku tangkap gambar ajelah.
Ini dia punya SPEC :
Protective Cover
Hinged, transparent, with means for sealing, for Pushbutton.
Front Size : 29 mm dia
Product : EAO
Ada beberapa concern nak beli benda alah ni. Kena tengok size and then apa jenis cabinet kita pakai.
Benda alahnya simple aje tapi CUKUP bernilai bagi mennyelamatakan platform dari ESD dan PSD.
Sunday, November 16, 2008
Competitor Oil n Gas Industry In Malaysia
Below I list the company :
1. Yokogawa Kontrol System. (DCS) Puchong
2. Yokogawa Saftey. (SDS/SIS/IPS/FGS) Puchong
3. Trisystem Engineering Sdn. Bhd (SIS/FGS/SDS/IPS) Shah ALam
4. Emerson. (DCS/SIS/FGS/SDS/IPS)
5. Tanjung
6. ABB
7. Foxboro
8. Honeywell
9. Heaven
I experienced with Yokogawa and Trisystem.
For future, i will look to another company and new challenge.
Tuesday, November 11, 2008
Tuesday, November 4, 2008
CHECKLIST PREPARATIONS GO TO OFFSHORE
Scope of preparation
1. Mental & physical
2. Knowledge
2.1 Study latest logic
2.2 Study overall system
2.3 Study what to be done
2.4 Procedures to download all or download change
3. Technical skill
4. Cloths (Offshore)
4.1 Coverall
4.2 Goggles
4.3
5. Tools
5.1 1.0mm (100m) white cable
5.2 Ferrules. What types?
5.3 Clamping ferrules
6. Financial (Petty Cash)
7. Family
8. Report form
9. Activities Form
10. Claim form
11. Travel (Limosin)
12. Communication (i-Talks)
Electrical Apparatus in Hazardous Area Crash Course
Based on my survey, I found that a lot of engineers cannot differentiate the differences between Ex'n' and Ex'e'. Also, only a few engineers realise that IEC requires the minimum of IP54 for cabinet that houses certified electrical apparatus to be installed in Zone 2 or even in Zone 1. The general mis-understanding is that we are required to use at least an IP65 cabinet.
To enhance the understanding on the electrical apparatus in hazardous area, I will conduct a crash course on that topic. The details of the crash course are as follows:
Date: Next week on Tuesday, 4/11/08
Time: 10:00am~12:30pm
Venue: Conference Room
The attendance is compulsory for the engineers and technicians from the TSE's Engineering Division (Project Department and CSD) including the UTP trainees. Other TriSystems' engineers and members are also welcomed to attend this 2.5-hour crash course.
Monday, November 3, 2008
Tuesday, October 28, 2008
My Report Offhore Trip
Project : Abu Cluster
Location : Abu A Platform
TSE Rep. : Muhammad Amin bin Hj Che Hassan
Client : Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd
Date of Service : 17 October 2008 until 21 October 2008
17/10/2008 (Friday)
- Mob to Abu A
- Attend safety briefing
- Site work preparation
18/10/2008 (Saturday)
- Internal wiring checks for PZT-0101A, PZT-0101B, PZT-0601 and SDV-0601.
Finding: Tag at PZT-0101A need to change to TB-B +123, TB-B -124 and PZT-0101B to TB-B +125, TB-B -126.
- Continuity checks for instrument South West well area with Local Engineering personal. For production line two pressure transmitter PZT-0101A and PZT-0101B. For gas lift line is a PZT-0601 and SDV-0601. All pressure transmitter and shutdown valve solenoid A and B success for continuity checks.
- Continuity check for instrument Abu Kecil 2 well area with Local Engineering personal. For production line two pressure transmitter PZT-0104A and PZT-0104B. For gas lift line is a PZT-0604 and SDV-0604. All pressure transmitter and shutdown valve solenoid A and B success for continuity checks.
19/10/2008 (Sunday)
- Functional test for instrument South West well area with Local Engineering personal. For production line two pressure transmitter PZT-0101A and PZT-0101B. For gas lift line is a PZT-0601 and SDV-0601.
- Inject pressure at PZT-0101A and PZT-0101B for gets HH (5680kpag) and LL (410kpag). Set point HH (PZAHH-0101A, PZAHH-0101B) and LL (PZALL-101A, PZALL-0101B) triggered at SIS and alarms display at DCS. Test successful.
- Activate solenoid A (SXV-0601A) and solenoid B (SXV-0601B) for SDV-0601. Finding: Voltage from marshalling cabinet MDF4500B for solenoid A (SXV-0601A) and solenoid B (SXV-0601B) drop from 24V to 12V only. Although voltage drops, solenoid A and B still function SDV-0601 can open.
- Functional test for instrument Abu Kecil well area with Local Engineering personal. For production line two pressure transmitter PZT-0104A and PZT-0104B. For gas lift line is a PZT-0604 and SDV-0604.
- Inject pressure at PZT-0104A and PZT-0104B for gets HH (5680kpag) and LL (410kpag). Set point HH (PZAHH-0104A, PZAHH-0104B) and LL (PZALL-104A, PZALL-0104B) triggered at SIS and alarms display at DCS. Test successful.
- Activate solenoid A (SXV-0604A) and solenoid B (SXV-0604B) for SDV-0604. Finding: Voltage from marshalling cabinet MDF4500B for solenoid A (SXV-0604A) and solenoid B (SXV-0604B) drop from 24V to 12V only. Although voltage drops, solenoid A and B still function and SDV-0604 can open.
20/10/2008 (Monday)
- Functional test for valve SSV-0104 and SCSSV-0104 at Abu Kecil 2 well area with Local Engineering personal. Witness by operation (Mr.Rafidi).
- Sequence to functional test SSV-0104 and SCSSV-0104 at Abu Kecil 2 well area:
- Apply MOS at PZT -0104A and PZT -0104B.
- Open SCSSV-0104. Pressure at PZT-0041B increased around 32000kpag.
- Open SSV-0104. Pressure at PZT-0041A increased.
- Closed SSV-0104.
- Disable MOS at PZT -0104A and PZT-0104B
- Pressurize at PZT-0104A and PZT-0104B to get a normal pressure.
- Open SSV-0104. Successful.
- Pressurize at PZT-0104A and PZT-0104B to get a HH setting.
- SIS triggered HH set point and SSV-0104 closed.
- Pressurize back at PZT-0104A and PZT-0104B to get a normal pressure
- Open SSV-0104.
- Pressurize at PZT-0104A and PZT-0104B to get a LL setting.
- SIS triggered LL set point and SSV-0104 closed.
- Functional test for valve SSV-0104 and SCSSV-0104 successful.
21/10/2008 (Tuesday).
- Report writing
- Demob to Kerteh.
Back To Abu A Platform
Monday, September 8, 2008
Task August
2) Prepare As-Built Document CCTV
3) Prepare As-Built Document EPCC J4
Task This Week
2) Involved with CPOC teams - Chocke Valve Design Software
Tuesday, July 15, 2008
FGS
Fire and Gas (FGS) System
A fire and gas system is composed of sensors, logic solver, and final elements designed to detect combustible gas, toxic gas, or fire and either
a) Alarm the condition
b) Takes the process to safe state
c) Take action to mitigate the consequences of hazardous event
Sensors may consist of heat, smoke, flame, and gas detectors, along with manual call boxes. Logic systems may consist of conventional PLCs, distributed control system (DCS), safety PLCs, special purpose PLCs designed specifically for FGS applications or dedicated multi-loop FGS controllers. Final elements may consist of flashing/strobe lights, sirens, a telephone notification system, exploding squibs, deluge systems, suppression systems, and/or process shutdowns.
Safety Instrumented Systems, Design, Analysis and Justification 2nd Edition Paul Gruhn, and Harry L.Cheddie
SIS
What is a safety instrumented system (SIS)?
Safety interlock system, safety instrumented system, safety shutdown system, emergency shutdown system, protective instrument system-the assorted names go on and on!
These systems are designed to :
a) Permit to process to move forward in a safe manner when specified conditions allow, or
b) Automatically take the process to a safe state when specified conditions are violated, or
c) Take action to mitigate the consequence of industrial hazad.
Safety Instrumented Systems, Design, Analysis and Justification 2nd Edition Paul Gruhn, and Harry L.Cheddie
Internal FAT Seligi
Monday, July 14, 2008
Wednesday, April 23, 2008
Yokogawa, Emerson, Foxboro, Honeywell
Aku sudah pernah bekerja di Yokogawa selama dua tahun. Best experience kat sana.
DCS, SIS/SDS dan FGS
Biasanya Petronas menggunakan short PMCS (Plant Monitoring Control System). Tetapi dalam ExxonMobil, Shell atau lain-lain masih menggunakan istilah DCS.
Apa dia DCS? Secara ringkasnya DCS ialah merupakan sistem aplikasi kawalan terhadap instrumen seperti transmitter, valve, fieldbus transmitter dan juga untuk komunikasi dengan modbus.
SIS (Safety Istrument System)
Nanti akan saya huraikan.
FGS (Fire and Gas System)
Nanti akan saya huraikan.
Daripada Yokogawa ke Trisystem
Fasa Kedua Kerjayaku
Yokogawa telah diperkenalkan oleh kawan senior saya Khairudin. Alhamdulillah dengan dua kali interview saya telah berjaya bekerja di Yokogawa. Saya mula bekerja pada 10/2/2006.
Masa di Yokogawa saya lebih terdedah kepada sistem DCS/PMCS. DCS=Distributed Kontrol Sistem. PMCS=Plant Monitoring Control System.
Pengalaman pertama saya ialah terlibat secara full time dengan project Abu Cluster di bawah Petronas.
Tanggal 29/2/2008 saya keluar dari Yokogawa. Pada 10/3/2008 saya memulakan kerjaya saya di Trisystem di Bukit Jelutong.
Trisystem lebih memfokuskan bidang Safety System. Perisian utama yang digunakan ialah Tricon. Kini saya terlibat dalam project Seligi E dan C di bawah ExxonMobil.